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Cumulative Trauma Disorders: OSHA's General Duty Clause
and the Need for an Ergonomics Standard
David J. Kolesar

The prevalence of repetitive tasks in the modem workplace is the
natural consequence of advanced industrial technology. 1 Increasing
specialization in the production process requires that each worker perform an ever-decreasing range of tasks more and more often. For example, a worker in a poultry processing plant may make 14,120 cuts to
debone as many as 3780 turkeys during one shift.2 A typist may strike
more than 10,000 keystrokes per hour. 3 A packer at a tea factory may
perform the same hand movements 12,000 times in one shift.4 Each
motion involved may seem innocuous in itself, but one can imagine
that the staggering number of repetitions eventually might cause physical injury. Although the full extent of damage caused by repetitive
motions is uncertain, 5 rapidly growing public awareness has made cumulative trauma disorders (CTDs) "the No. 1 occupational hazard of
the 1990's."6
The term CTDs designates a diverse assortment of disorders that
can affect both the musculoskeletal system and the peripheral nervous
system. 7 CTDs most often affect the soft tissues of the hands, wrists,
1. See Willis J. Goldsmith, Cu"ent Developments in Safety and Health: Workplace Ergonomics: A Safety and Health Issue for the '90s, IS EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 291, 293 (1989) (noting
that assembly lines distribute production tasks and that each employee repeatedly performs a
small set of tasks); Maria Mallory & Hazel Bradford, An Invisible Workplace Hazard Gets
Harder to Ignore, Bus. WK., Jan. 30, 1989, at 92 (stating that advanced technology divides jobs
into much smaller tasks than even a normal assembly line does).
2. Thomas J. Armstrong et al., Ergonomics Considerations in Hand and Wrist Tendinitis, 12
J. HAND SURGERY 830, 833 (1987).
3. Mallory & Bradford, supra note 1, at 92.
4. Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 833.
S. Whether or not repetition alone can cause injury is still a matter of debate. While some
studies, e.g., Barbara A. Silverstein et al., Occupational Factors and Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, 11
AM. J. INDUS. MED. 343, 353 (1987), as well as intuition, see In re Establishment Inspection of
Midwest Instruments Co., 900 F.2d 1150, 1154 (7th Cir. 1990), suggest that repetition of certain
motions can cause bodily injury, some musculoskeletal-injury experts insist that there is no evidence that repetition causes physical damage or injury. E.g., Nortin M. Hadler, Illness in the
Workplace.· The Challenge ofMusculoskeletal Symptoms, 10 J. HAND SURGERY 451, 454 (1985).
6. Dramatic Rise in Repetitive Motion Injuries and OSHA '.I' Response: Hearing Before the
Employment and Housing Subcomm. of House Comm. on Government Operations, IOlst Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1989) [hereinafter House Hearing] (opening statement of Tom Lantos, Chairman).
7. Barbara A. Silverstein et al., Hand-Wrist Disorders Among Investment Casting Plant
Workers, 12 J. HAND SURGERY 838, 838 (1987). For example, some commonly reported CTDs
include carpal tunnel syndrome, tendinitis, tenosynovitis, low back pain, DeQuervain's Disease,
Raynaud's syndrome, and trigger-finger. See, e.g., House Panel Hears Testimony on Cumulative
Trauma Disorders, [1989 Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) ~ 10,112 (June
6, 1989).
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arms, neck, or back. 8 All CTDs develop gradually over time, 9 but the
particular symptoms and effects vary with the type of CTD. 10 CTD
sufferers almost always experience pain and often suffer impairment of
sensory, autonomic, and motor functions. 11 CTDs sometimes require
surgery 12 and occasionally develop into permanent disabilities. 13
A debate about the relative causal contributions of occupational
and nonoccupational factors to the development of CTDs currently
divides the medical community. 14 Experts face the difficult task of
isolating a specific factor from a variety of possible causes, each of
which probably has some influence on the occurrence of CTDs. 15
8. Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 292.
9. See id. at 291.
10. Symptoms of tendinitis, for example, include lingering pain radiating up the forearm and
swelling of the affected area. Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 831-32. Symptoms of carpal
tunnel syndrome include recurring or persistent pain, numbness, and tingling in the hand and
wrist, loss of the ability to grasp objects, and loss of strength and dexterity. Victoria R. Masear
et al., An Industrial Cause of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, I IA J. HAND SURGERY 222, 222 (1986);
Silverstein et al., supra note 5, at 347.
11. Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 292. The impairment of these three functions frequently
occurs in carpal tunnel syndrome, the most well-known and commonly cited CTD. See Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 830.
12. See. e.g., William J. Maakestad & Charles Helm, Promoting Workplace Safely and

Health in the Post-Regulatory Era: A Primer on Non-OSHA Legal Incentives That Influence
Employer Decisions To Control Occupational Hazards, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 9, 10-11 (1989). For
an opinion on the propriety of surgery as a readily available option for sufferers of CTDs, see
Nortin M. Hadler, Cumulative Trauma Disorders: An Iatrogenic Concept, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL
MED. 38, 40 (1990) (finding that there is no reliable basis on which to justify surgery in most
cases and that workers should be left to their natural coping mechanisms); see also Dean S.
Louis, Cumulative Trauma Disorders. 12 J. HAND SURGERY 823, 825 (1987) ("Nonsurgical
problems, such as many of the cumulative trauma disorders that we [hand surgeons] see, require
restraint .•••").
13. While disabilities have been reported, such extreme cases have been rare. For example,
Armstrong cites a study of an electronics firm spanning six years in which only two CTD cases
were classified as disabilities. Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 831; see infra section II.D (analyzing the seriousness of harm caused by CTDs).
14. "It is almost always possible to find cases to argue for one factor or set of factors over
another." Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 831; compare Silverstein et al., supra note 5, at 356
(concluding that repetitiveness and forcefulness contribute strongly to the incidence of CTDs and
that this finding cannot be explained by nonoccupational factors) with Hadler, supra note 12, at
39 (finding that CTDs in the workplace are caused by many factors and that "[occupational]
usage is only one factor and not overwhelming, at that"); see infra section II.D (analyzing the
controversy concerning the causation of CTDs).
15. Suspected causes of CTDs include repetitive motions, forceful exertions, awkward postures, and vibrations, as well as congenital defects, chronic diseases, aging, gender, and recreational usages. Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 831. The diversity of CTD symptoms and their
long latency period make attributing causation to specific factors even more difficult. Due to
their cumulative nature, CTDs necessarily require long periods of time to manifest themselves in
recognizable symptoms. In fact, many of those affected by CTDs at least initially attribute their
discomfort to such factors as aging. See, e.g., House Panel Hears Testimony on Cumulative
Trauma Disorders, [1989 Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) ~ 10,112 (June
6, 1989) (attributing the increase in CTDs to the aging workforce among other factors). Additionally, the latency period also increases the likelihood that a worker will not be engaged in the
particular occupation alleged to have caused the CTD at the time the symptoms strike, because
of either a job change or a variety of other reasons. For example, one symptom of carpal tunnel
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While medical science has known for more than two centuries that
certain motions may injure the body, 16 only recently has attention focused on the possibility that the nature of one's work causes CTDs.17
The heightened concern about the relationship betw~en CTDs and
occupations stems from a dramatic increase in the number of reported
CTDs at the workplace in recent years. The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) estimates that more than
five million workers suffered from motion injuries in 1986, and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) projects that
by the year 2000, half of all workers' compensation claims will be related to CTDs. 18 A 1980 study found that sixteen million workdays
per year were lost due to CTDs. 19 The figures continue to grow.
From 1987 to 1988, the number of reported CTDs increased by fiftyeight percent. 20 This dramatic rise has prompted greater interest in
ergonomics, the study of workstation and tool design to prevent workers' injuries. 21 While the theory behind ergonomics has won considerable popularity, however, ergonomics has not been widely accepted as
a medical discipline or a full-fledged science, and its tenets have failed
to convince many experts. 22 Nevertheless, ergonomics has highlighted
syndrome is a sharp pain while sleeping at night. See,.e.g., Masear et al., supra note 10, at 222.
Night is a time of day least likely to be associated by the worker with his job.
16. In 1713, Bernardini Ramazzini recognized that workers can be injured by "certain violent and irregular motions and unnatural postures of the body." BERNARDINI RAMAZZINI, DISEASES OF WORKERS 15 (Wilmer c. Wright trans., 1940) (1713).
17. Jeffrey G. Huvelle & Michael G. Michaelson, Stiff Wrists at Work Mean Stiff Fines for
Many U.S. Businesses, LEGAL TIMES Feb. 12, 1990 at 24, 24. The connection between occupations and CTDs has only recently been posited in part because the number of reported workplace
CTDs has recently increased dramatically. See infra text accompanying note 23. Why this increase in reported CTDs developed, however, is a point of debate. While some maintain that
CTDs stem from the use of advanced technology, e.g., Mallory & Bradford, supra note 1, at 92,
93 (calling CTDs "the first major postindustrial illness"), others assert that the recent increase in
reported CTDs resulted from workers being told that they have been "injured," see Hadler, supra
note 12, at 38-40, or from the availability of workers' compensation. John D. Worrall & David
Appel, The Impact of Workers' Compensation Benefits on Low-Back Claims, in CLINICAL CONCEPTS IN REGIONAL MUSCULOSKELETAL ILLNESS 281, 295-96 (Nortin M. Hadler ed., 1987)
(citing a study and finding that the availability of workers' compensation gives workers an incentive to claim more severe disabilities and to claim more often); Louis, supra note 12, at 825
(concluding that workers' compensation has a detrimental effect on workers by inducing them to
claim an injury and adopt disability status). Still others maintain that the recent increase in the
number of reported CTDs is a consequence of a change in the law concerning employer recordkeeping. See, e.g., Dan Malovany, Pepperidge, Chicago Law Firm Challenge OSHA, BAKERY
PRODS. & MKTG., Oct. 24, 1990, at 30.
18. Mallory & Bradford, supra note 1, at 92.
19. Louis, supra note 12, at 823. Not surprisingly, the economic effect is also considerable.
The American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons estimated that, in 1984, CTDs caused $27 billion per year in lost earnings and medical expenses. See House Hearing, supra note 6, at 2.
20. Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 24 (citing the Bureau of Labor Statistics).
21. See id. (stating that ergonomics tries to improve the "machine-person interface").

22. See id. For a critical account, see Hadler, supra note 12, at 39; Malovany, supra note 17,
at 30.
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the potential scope of the CTD problem. 23
Complex medical issues surrounding CTDs in the workplace create special problems in evaluating the legal significance of CTDs.
OSHA, the agency charged with protecting workers, 24 currently prosecutes employers for failing to eliminate CTDs from the workplace
under the assumption that such a failure violates the "general duty"
clause25 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the Act). 26 An
employer's "general duty" is to furnish a place of employment "free
from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death
or serious physical harm ...." 27 To enforce the employer's duty,
OSHA issues citations and imposes large fines for exposing employees
to CTDs. 28 Many employers choose to settle with OSHA rather than
challenge these citations in court as an improper application of the
general duty clause. 29 As a result, no court has yet decided the issue
whether OSHA has properly interpreted the general duty clause to
apply to CTDs under a so-called ergonomics violation. 30
OSHA's handling of CTDs must be reevaluated. The general duty
clause affords OSHA a convenient means to respond to the popular
concern about CTDs without engaging in the more time-consuming
process of promulgating a permanent standard. The promulgation
process, however, has merits that OSHA should not expediently overlook. Initiated and controlled by the Secretary of Labor, the process
provides for extensive research and investigation and assures that interested parties have the opportunity to supply evidence and voice
their concerns. 31 OSHA's current use of the general duty clause to
23. Cf. Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 831 ("Although morbidity studies .•• indicate a
problem of epidemic proportions, the magnitude is probably underestimated.").
24. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988) provides: "Each employer ... shall furnish to each of his
employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees ••••"
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988); see Dole Issues Ergonomic Guides for Red Meat Industry,
Promises General Regulations Across All Industries, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 170, at A-7
(Aug. 31, 1990) [hereinafter Dole Issues Ergonomic Guides] (noting that the general duty clause
will continue to be used to prosecute employers for exposing workers to CTDs).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988).
28. For example, in 1988, OSHA levied a $3.1 million fine against IBP, Inc., the nation's
largest meatpacker, for exposing 20% of its workers to CTDs. Maakestad & Helm, supra note
12, at 11. Five months later, OSHA fined John Morrell & Co., another prominent meatpacker,
$4.3 million for similar CTD-related reasons. Id. at 10 (concerning hand and arm disorders).
29. See Roger L. Freeman, OSHA: Standards Are Largely Undefined for Repetitive-Motion
Injuries, NATL. L.J., July 29, 1991, at 28, 28.
30. Ergonomics violation refers to a violation of the general duty clause in which the "hazard" is the exposure of employees to CTDs. See, e.g., id. The term assumes that such exposure is
a violation of the clause. As of June 16, 1992, Secretary of Labor v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc.,
OSHRC No. 89-265, in which Pepperidge Farm contests an OSHA citation for ergonomics violations, was before an administrative law judge.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(l)-(3) (1988). The promulgation process is the Act's primary enforcement mechanism. See infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
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prosecute employers for alleged ergonomics violations, by contrast, is
a haphazard attempt to deal with the effects of a complex problem. It
also violates the intended role of the general duty clause. Given the
controversial nature of CTDs, the appropriate remedy - and its consequences - should be carefully considered. The decision whether to
enforce the Act through the clause or through a standard should be
resolved in favor of the fairest and most effective means of protecting
the potential victims of CTDs. 32 Use of the general duty clause to
minimize CTDs fails to meet these criteria.
This Note argues that neither the Act nor its underlying policies
supports OSHA's current use of the general duty clause to prosecute
alleged ergonomics violations and that the only way to protect workers from CTDs fairly and effectively is through the promulgation of an
ergonomics standard. Part I examines the purposes of the Act, as well
as the function of the Act's general duty clause. Part II analyzes the
four requirements of the general duty clause in the context of CTDs
and finds that the clause does not apply to CTDs. Part III argues that
the Act's intended policies support the promulgation of an ergonomics
standard rather than the use of the general duty clause. This Note
concludes that the Secretary of Labor should promulgate an ergonomics standard3 3 as soon as possible and that, until then, the general
duty clause should not be used to prosecute employers for alleged
ergonomics violations.

I.

THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE

ACT

AND THE

This Part explores the function of the general duty clause as a constituent part of the Act. Section I.A reviews the Act's purposes and
explains that the promulgation of standards is OSHA's primary enforcement mechanism. Section I.B demonstrates that the general duty
clause plays a secondary role in enforcement and should be invoked
only in certain circumstances. Section I.C examines the use of the
general duty clause to penalize employers for CTD occurrences and
the limited legal authority for dealing with the CTD problem in such a
manner. Part I concludes that OSHA's practice of applying the general duty clause to CTDs deserves critical scrutiny.
32. Congress recognized the need for the Act to have the respect and confidence of both
workers and employers: "The Jaw we pass today must be strong, effective, workable, and fair
• . . . It must guarantee to each American worker a mechanism for developing and enforcing safe
and healthful working conditions; and it must guarantee to each employer objectivity, fairness,
and due process." 116 CONG. REc. 38,370 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger).
33. This Note does not argue for the content of any particular ergonomics standard. That
will necessarily be left for resolution through the promulgation process. Moreover, reference to
"an ergonomics standard" is intended to encompass the possibility of multiple ergonomics standards. In all likelihood, multiple standards will be appropriate and necessary due to the pervasiveness of CTDs. For example, "specific" promulgated standards might be tailored to various
high-risk operations or equipment. See infra note 191 and text accompanying notes 190-91.
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In the four years prior to the 1970 passage of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, more Americans were killed in industrial accidents (over 14,500 per year) than in the Vietnam War. 34 By one conservative estimate, more than 2.2 million workers were disabled on the
job each year. 35 Such statistics, the "unfortunate by-product of our
industrial progress," 36 revealed the inadequacy of leaving to the states
and private industry the responsibility of providing a safe and healthful workplace. 37 In 1970, Congress declared the need for immediate
action and passed the Act to deal with this grim situation. 38
The Act, representing the first comprehensive attempt at federal
regulation of workplace safety and health, 39 seeks "to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions .... " 40 Because it is based on Congress' power
to regulate interstate commerce,41 the Act reaches virtually all workplaces.42 As a result, the Act has the broadest possible scope for reducing the number and severity of work-related injuries.43
Responsibility for enforcing the Act rests with OSHA, the federal
regulatory agency established by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to
the Act. 44 If, after inspection of a workplace, OSHA believes that a
violation of the Act has occurred, the Act requires OSHA to issue a
citation to the employer45 and authorizes the assessment of a pen34. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177,
5178.
35. Id. (stating that this figure is "the lowest count").
36. Marjorie E. Gross, The Occupational Safety & Health Act: Much Ado About Something,
3 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 247, 249 (1972).
37. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177,
5218 (individual views of Sen. Javits).
38. "The knowledge that the industrial accident situation is deteriorating, rather than improving, underscores the need for action now." Id. at 5178. In addition to the cost in terms of
human lives, Congress found that work-related injuries and illnesses imposed a substantial burden on interstate commerce in the form of lost production, lost wages, medical expenses, and
disability compensation payments. 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) (1988).
39. Richard S. Morey, The General Duty Clause ofthe Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, 86 HARV. L. REv. 988, 988 (1973).
40. 29 u.s.c. § 651(b) (1988).
41. 29 u.s.c. § 651(b) (1988).
42. Gross, supra note 36, at 252 (noting that the Act's broad scope covers "virtually every
man and woman who is employed in the United States"); see also 116 CONG. REC. 38,371 (1970)
(statement of Rep. Steiger) (noting that the Act "deals with every conceivable type of industry
and business ....").
43. The breadth of the Act is consistent with Congress' finding that hazards of modem industry "are not the problem of a single employer, a single industry, nor a single state jurisdiction.
The spread of industry and the mobility of the workforce combine to make the health and safety
of the worker truly a national concern." S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted
in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5180.
44. Secretary of Labor's Order 12-71, 36 Fed. Reg. 8754 (1971).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1988).
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alty. 46 If the employer wishes to contest the citation and penalty, the
Act entitles it to a hearing before the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission (OSHRC), an independent adjudicatory agency
whose sole function is to hear challenges to OSHA enforcement
actions. 47
The Act provides OSHA with two broad means of enforcement:
the promulgation of safety and health standards and, where no standard applies, the general duty clause.48 Congress intended promulgated standards to be OSHA's primary means of enforcement; where a
standard applies, it always takes precedence over the general duty
clause. 49 Any other outcome would be "inconsistent with the overall
purpose of the Act" and would render the promulgation provisions
ineffectual. so Standards are to represent achievable requirements
based on research, past experience, and the latest scientific evidence
and should assure, as far as possible, that no employee suffers impaired
health from exposure to the hazard involved.s1
Promulgated standards are OSHA's primary means of enforcement because they most effectively carry out the Act's purposes. sz
Congress passed the Act in part to achieve uniform national safety and
health conditions. s3 Promulgated standards most effectively accomplish this objective by providing guidance to employers. s4 Standards
also assure that workplace safety and health is achieved through a
"fair and effective" mechanism.ss Congress was concerned that em46. 29 u.s.c. §§ 659, 666 (1988).
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(c), 661 (1988). Aggrieved parties may then appeal the OSHRC's order
to the relevant circuit court. 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1988). If the employer fails timely to notify the
Secretary of its intent to contest an OSHA enforcement action, the citation and penalty are
deemed final orders of the OSHRC, not subject to review by any court or agency. 29 U.S.C.
§ 659(a) (1988).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1988); e.g., Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643, at
35,971 (July 23, 1986).
49. Brisk Waterproofing Co., 1973-1974 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 16,345, at 21,261 (July 27,
1973). The natural corollary is that a citation for a violation of the general duty clause is invalid
where a duly promulgated standard applies. See also 116 CoNG. REc. 42,206 (1970) (statement
of Rep. Steiger) (stating that primary reliance will be placed on standards). But see UAW v.
General Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570, 1577 (D.C. Cir.) (suggesting that the general
duty clause may play a role, even when a standard applies, if the employer has knowledge of the
standard's inadequacy), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987); infra note 66.
50. Brisk Waterproofing Co., 1973-1974 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 16,345, at 21,261 (July 27,
1973).
51. S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177,
5183-84.
52. See infra Part III.
53. See S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), repnizted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177,
5177; infra section 111.A.2 (discussing the Act's policy of consistency).
54. See 116 CONG. REC. 42,206 (1970). "[O]ne of the primary purposes in enacting this
legislation stems from the need to provide employers with health standards so that they might
better protect the health and safety of the worker by providing the necessary machinery and
protective devices in the workplace." Id.
55. Id. (statement of Rep. Steiger)
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ployers be subject only to enforcement mechanisms that had undergone "procedural scrutiny." 56 The Act incorporates this safeguard
into OSHA rulemaking by providing for recommendations, public
hearings, and opportunities for opposing viewpoints to be heard concerning proposed standards. s1
As of yet, the Secretary of Labor has not promulgated an ergonomics standard. On August 30, 1990, Secretary Elizabeth Dole announced a plan to extend recently adopted ergonomics guidelines for
the red meat industry to all industries; the extension was to be a step
toward the development of an ergonomics standard for general industry. 58 Ten days later, however, the Secretary canceled the extension of
the guidelines and postponed the promulgation process until the need
for an ergonomics standard could be further determined. 59 Secretary
Dole stated that absent a specific standard, OSHA will continue to
prosecute employers for alleged ergonomics violations under the general duty clause. 60
The decision to continue prosecution under the general duty clause
abandons the procedural safeguards of the promulgation process.
Moreover, it is not in the best interests of workers. To the extent that
OSHA relies on the clause as a substitute for an ergonomics standard, 61 it actually harms workers by preventing the promulgation of
what would be a more effective and fair remedy for CTDs. 62
B.

The Role of the General Duty Clause

In the Act's enforcement scheme, the general duty clause plays a
secondary role. In situations covered by a promulgated standard, the
Act subordinates the general duty clause to the standard. 63 While the
56. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1910 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177,
5182 (noting the importance of the opportunity for interested persons to express their views); 116
CoNG. REc. 38,373 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger) (noting that standards must be scrutinized
before they are promulgated to verify the legitimacy of their origins and methods).
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(l).(3) (1988).
58. Dole Issues Ergonomic Guides, supra note 26, at A-7. A general industry standard is one
applicable to many employers in various industries. SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW,
AMERICAN BAR AssN., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 167 (Stephen A. Bokat et
al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter BOKAT].
59. Meg Fletcher, OSHA Drops Plan To Extend Safety Rules, Bus. INS., Sept. 10, 1990, at
28. The decision to stop the promulgation process until more information could be gathered did
not affect the release of the guidelines for the red meat industry. See id.
60. Dole Issues Ergonomic Guides, supra note 26, at A-7.
61. The general duty clause was not intended to be a substitute for promulgated standards.
BOKAT, supra note 58, at 109.
62. OSHA's continued reliance on the general duty clause implies that the clause is the functional equivalent of an ergonomics standard. This implication makes concerns about the proper
enforcement mechanism seem irrelevant and therefore diverts attention from the inadequacies of
the general duty clause as applied to CTDs. See infra text accompanying note 170 (concluding
that CTDs fail to satisfy the four requirements of the general duty clause).
63. See Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643, at 35,971 (July 23, 1986)
(noting that the general duty clause can be invoked only where no specific standard applies).
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general duty clause should fill the interstices that will necessarily exist
within the network of standards, 64 allowing prosecution under the
general duty clause where a standard applies would be "inconsistent
with the overall purpose of the Act, would emasculate all the provisions dealing with the promulgation of standards, and would give a
wider effect to the Act's general duty clause than was ever intended by
Congress." 65 Absent an employer's knowledge that a promulgated
standard is an inadequate protection for workers, compliance with a
standard precludes liability under the general duty clause. 66
The interstitial coverage of the clause, together with the coverage
of promulgated standards, does not address all harmful conditions in
workplaces. 67 Although the general duty clause applies to situations
not covered by standards, it does not apply to every such situation.
Decisions by the OSHRC support the argument that there will be
harmful conditions and injuries to which the general duty clause does
not apply. For example, in Alabama Power Co., 68 the OSHRC was
asked to overturn a general duty citation issued against Alabama
Power Company for failure to take adequate precautions to protect its
employees from being crushed by an overturning coal truck.
Although the OSHRC found that the employees were exposed to a
hazard of being seriously injured or killed by an overturning truck, it
vacated the citation because the Secretary of Labor failed to establish a
more effective feasible means by which the Company could have freed
its workplace of the hazard. 69
64. Cf. Dravo Corp. v. OSHRC, 613 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1980) ("The Secretary cannot
be expected to have anticipated every conceivable hazardous situation in promulgating specific
standards.").
65. Brisk Waterproofing Co., 1973-1974 0.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1! 16,345, at 21,261 (July 27,
1973).
66. See UAW v. General Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570, 1577 (D.C. Cir.) ("[A]n
employer may rely on his compliance with a safety standard to absolve him from liability •.• and
he will be deemed to have met his obligation under the general duty clause ...."), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 976 (1987). Confronted with allegations that General Dynamics knew a freon standard
to be an inadequate protection for workers, the court held that if an employer knows that a
standard will not protect its workers, its general duty will not be discharged. 815 F.2d at 1577.
This twist in the interplay between the general duty clause and promulgated standards arises
only in this special factual situation, as the court implied. 815 F.2d at 1577 ("Scienter is the
key.").
67. To avoid confusion, the term harmful condition is used here instead of the term hazard.
In general, a harmful condition can be a "hazard" without being a "recognized hazard," a critical distinction in applying the general duty clause. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H.
Dec. (CCH) 1! 27,517, at 35,670 (Mar. 4, 1986) (finding that while explosions are possible if
molten metal merely contacts water, the hazard is "recognized" only if the water is entrapped or
encapsulated by the molten metal); National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257,
1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that a hazard will not be "recognized" unless it is preventable).
68. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1f 27,892 (Apr. 17, 1987).
69. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 36,578, 36,581; see also John Gill Ranch, 1987-1990
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1! 28,796, at 38,391 (Nov. 1, 1989) (hazard of working in stooped position
while pulling weeds in a spinach field not covered by general duty clause); U.S. Steel Corp., 19861987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1! 27,517, at 35,675 (Mar. 4, 1986) (hazard of explosion from pouring
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The general duty clause's language also indicates that the clause
applies only in a restricted set of circumstances. Contrary to the implications that one might draw from its popular name, the general
duty clause is not simply an extension of the common law duty of
reasonable care - the clause imposes a higher duty that applies only
in special circumstances.70 According to the general duty clause, an
employer must "furnish to each of his employees employment and a
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm ...." 71
Courts and the OSHRC have articulated four requirements contained
in this language, analyzed in detail in Part II below, that OSHA must
prove to establish a violation. 72 Congress subordinated the clause to
promulgated standards and carefully circumscribed its applicability
for fear that it provided little notice to employers about the requirements for ensuring a safe and healthful workplace.73
C. Legal Authority for Applying the General Duty Clause to CTDs
Courts have yet to conclude whether the general duty clause applies to CTDs. The clause does apply in a variety of other situations,
however. For example, courts have found violations in failing to protect against oxygen-deficient atmospheres of "dry" manholes;74 in permitting a freight elevator in a lead smelting plant to operate with the
doors and gates open; 75 and in failing to protect employees in the steel
and iron casting industry against heat stress. 76 The large fines imposed by OSHA for alleged ergonomics violations have generally
and transferring molten metal near water and ice accumulations at two of five locations not
covered by general duty clause).
70. Although the Senate Report implies that the general duty clause imposes a duty that is at
least analogous to the common law duty of reasonable care, see S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186; Gross, supra note 36, at 253 (para·
phrasing the committee's conclusion on the topic), the better-reasoned views on the subject find
important distinctions between the common law duty and an employer's general duty. The gen·
eral duty is more focused than the common law duty: four statutory requirements must be satis·
fied, see generally infra Part II, but the general duty requires a higher degree of care. See
National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating
that employers must take more than merely "reasonable" precautions); 116 CoNG. REC. 38,371
(1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger) (noting that, while the common law duty is an after-the-fact
method of assessing fault, the general duty is a before-the-inquiry method of preventing injuries
and concluding that the general duty's scope should be limited to prevent unjust application).
But see Morey, supra note 39, at 1004 (noting that tort concepts of the duty of reasonable care
may be useful to analysis of the general duty clause in some contexts, especially employee
misconduct).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988).
72. E.g., Petron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 11 27,605, at 35,871 (June 2, 1986).
73. See Brisk Waterproofing Co., 1973-1974 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1] 16,345, at 21,261 (July 27,
1973).
74. Ed Taylor Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 938 F.2d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 1991).
75. St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. OSHRC, 647 F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 1981).
76. Duriron Co. v. OSHRC, 750 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir. 1984).
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prompted cited employers to settle before a court could determine the
clause's applicability to CTDs. 77
Circuit courts have described the sufficiency of evidence needed in
a complaint for OSHA to secure an inspection warrant for alleged
CTD violations. 78 For example, in United States v. Establishment Inspection ofJeep Corp., 19 employees complained that they were exposed
to unsafe usage of hand tools, that they were forced to use their hands
to install parts in an unsafe manner, and that, as a result, they acquired carpal tunnel syndrome. The Sixth Circuit found that the complaint presented OSHA with enough evidence to form a reasonable
belief that a violation of the Act was being committed. 80
These decisions, however, do not represent a judicial endorsement
of the applicability of the general duty clause to CTDs. Less evidence
is needed to show administrative probable cause for an inspection warrant than is needed to show a probability of a violation. 81 In addition,
while the evidence must support a reasonable belief that the Act has
been violated, OSHA does not have to specify in its warrant application which regulation it believes is being violated. 82 The courts, therefore, have not provided a definitive statement on the applicability of
the general duty clause to CTDs. The primary role of the promulgation process in the Act's enforcement scheme suggests that it is the
preferred method for all appropriate harmful conditions. Any use of
the general duty clause as a mere expedient to bypass the promulgation process should be viewed with a critical eye. 8 3
77. For example, in 1990, Ford Motor Co. agreed to the most extensive ergonomics settlement in OSHA's history, under which it will implement a comprehensive ergonomics program
affecting 96% of its plants and will also pay a $1.2 million fine stemming from an inspection of
one of its plants. Ford Motor Company Agrees to Corporate-Wide Ergonomics Program Under
Settlement with OSHA, [1990 Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) 1f 10,585
(July 23, 1990) [hereinafter Ford Motor Company Agrees]. For other noteworthy settlements, see
Freeman, supra note 29, at 29 n.14.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1988) authorizes OSHA, upon receipt of a complaint from an
employee, to make a special inspection of a workplace if it determines that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a violation of a standard exists at the site. If the employer refuses permission to search the site, OSHA must procure an inspection warrant. See Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (holding that the Act is unconstitutional to the extent that it
purports to authorize inspections without a warrant). To obtain an inspection warrant, OSHA
need not show probable cause in the criminal sense. 436 U.S. at 320. "Administrative probable
cause" is sufficient. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 957 (11th Cir. 1982).
79. 836 F.2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1988).
80. 836 F.2d at 1027; see also In re Establishment Inspection of Midwest Instruments Co.,
900 F.2d 1150, 1152-53 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that a complaint describing the employees injured, the time of injury, the number and type of injuries (neck and wrist), and the believed cause
(working on assembly lines) was sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the Act was
implicated).
81. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 958 (11th Cir. 1982). The Sixth
Circuit has approved of this finding. See Establishment Inspection of Jeep Corp., 836 F.2d 1026,
1027 (6th Cir. 1988).
82. 836 F.2d at 1027.
83. See, e.g., Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1f 27,643, at 35,972 (July 23,
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THE GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE

The general duty clause protects employees working under "special circumstances" for which no standard has yet been adopted. 84
OSHA must satisfy four requirements to prove a general duty violation under the Act: (1) the employer has failed to "free" its workplace of a hazard; (2) the hazard is "recognized"; (3) the hazard
could have been materially reduced or eliminated by a feasible means
of abatement; and (4) the hazard is "causing or likely to cause death
or serious physical harm."85
This Part argues that workplace CTDs fail to satisfy these requirements. CTDs, with their special problems of causation, prevention,
and seriousness, are not the type of injury to which Congress intended
the general duty clause to apply. The four sections of this Part analyze
the four requirements in connection with CTDs and find that, because
of the special medical problems regarding CTDs, application of the
general duty clause fails the second and third requirements and likely
fails the fourth requirement as well. This Part concludes that because
CTDs fail to satisfy the requirements of the general duty clause,
OSHA should not use the clause in connection with CTDs.
A. Failure To Render Workplace Free of Hazard

Under the first prong of the general duty clause, OSHA must
prove that an employer failed to render its workplace "free" of recognized hazards. 86 Because employers exercise great control over workplace conditions, their obligation is not met by merely rendering a
workplace "reasonably free" of a hazard. 87 The obligation, however,
1986) (criticizing general duty citations because they resembled an attempt to sidestep the procedural requirements of the Act and vacating citations on other grounds).
84. S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177,
5186; see BoKAT, supra note 58, at 108 (noting that the general duty clause does not render
employers guarantors of employees' safety and health). The "special circumstances" in which
the general duty clause is to apply include cases in which no standard is specifically applicable,
see, e.g., Brisk Waterproofing Co., 1973-1974 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1! 16,345, at 21,261 (July 27,
1973); supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text, and in which the situation satisfies the four
requirements for applicability of the general duty clause. See, e.g., Petron Corp., 1986-1987
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1l 27,605, at 35,871 (June 2, 1986); infra note 85 and accompanying text.
85. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1973). National Realty, articulating elements one, two, and four, represents the first attempt by a circuit
court to interpret the general duty clause. The OSHRC adopted these elements and subsequently
added the "feasibility" requirement, see, e.g., Petron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)
1! 27,605, at 35,871 (June 2, 1986), which National Realty left unstated but implied. See BOKAT,
supra note 58, at 114.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988); see Petron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1! 27,605,
at 35,871 (June 2, 1986). For a discussion of the meaning of recognized hazards, see infra section

11.B.
87. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265-66 & n.34 (D.C. Cir.
1973). The court in National Realty reached this conclusion despite the language in the Senate
and House Reports stating that the general duty clause incorporates principles of common law
and "merely restates that each employer shall furnish this degree of care." S. REP. No. 1282,
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does not create strict liability. 88 Rather, the test takes a middle path:
a hazard exists at a workplace if OSHA demonstrates that employees
are exposed to a "significant risk" of harm. 8 9
The "significant risk" test developed from the Supreme Court's decision in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute. 90 In that case, the Court reviewed a newly promulgated
standard91 regulating occupational exposure to benzene, a carcinogen;
the new standard replaced a more permissive standard. Noting that
Congress did not intend the Act to create "risk-free" workplaces, the
Court concluded that before promulgating any permanent standard,
"the Secretary is required to make a threshold finding that a place of
employment is unsafe - in the sense that significant risks are present
and can be eliminated or lessened." 92 The Secretary's proof consisted
of a presumption that because the evidence in the record did not establish any level of benzene exposure as safe, exposure in any amount
must be hazardous.
The Court held that this proof failed to establish that the amount
by which the allowable benzene level under the old standard exceeded
that under the new standard posed a significant risk that would justify
promulgation of a new standard. 93 The Court noted, however, that
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186. The court based its
position on the employer's degree of control over the workplace as well as other language in the
Reports concerning the standard of care imposed by the general duty. The standard of care was
not characterized in terms of reasonableness: employers have a " 'duty to bring no adverse effects to the life and health of their employees.' " 489 F.2d at 1265 n.34 (quoting S. REP. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186); see supra note 70
and accompanying text (discussing the problems with interpreting the general duty as one of
reasonableness).
88. See, e.g., National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1265-66 ("The duty was to be an achievable one.").
89. Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 11 27,643, at 35,973-74 (July 23, 1986);
Anoplate Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 11 27,519, at 35,680 (Mar. 4, 1986) (stating that
where a standard requires proof of a "hazard" as an element of the violation, OSHA must show a
significant risk of harm). In Kastalon, the OSHRC vacated a general duty citation against Kastalon, Inc. because OSHA failed sufficiently to prove the existence of a hazard within the meaning of the general duty clause. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,979-80. "In order to
establish the existence of a hazard [within the meaning of the general duty clause], ... [t]he
Secretary must prove that the [hazard] to which employees are exposed presents a significant risk
of harm." 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,974. OSHA's evidence that MOCA, a chemical
used in Kastalon's manufacturing process, induced cancer in laboratory animals was too speculative to prove that exposure to MOCA in any detectable amount posed a significant risk to workers. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,974, 35,979-80.
90. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
91. Although the Court dealt with the extent of hazardous conditions necessary for the Secretary to promulgate a specific standard, the OSHRC has held that the Court's reasoning applies
equally to the general duty clause. Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 11 27,643, at
35,974, 35,975 n.7 (July 23, 1986). The Fifth Circuit disagrees. See Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v.
Donovan, 729 F.2d 317, 323-24 (5th Cir. 1984).
92. 448 U.S. at 642 (emphasis added).
93. 448 U.S. at 659. The Court explicitly declined to express an opinion as to what factual
determinations would warrant a conclusion that significant risks were present that would justify
a new standard. 448 U.S. at 659.
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OSHA is not required to prove significant risk to scientific certainty. 94
When operating on the "frontiers of scientific knowledge," OSHA
may make conservative assumptions and risk error on the side of overprotection, provided that it supports its findings with a "body of reputable scientific thought."9s
CTDs, like carcinogens, exist on the frontiers of scientific knowledge. While the evidence of the risk of harm from exposure to repetitive, forceful, or awkward motions in the workplace is inconclusive,
the conclusion that such risk exists is not unduly speculative. 96 Several comprehensive studies have concluded that occupations involving
a high degree of repetitiveness and forcefulness of motion create a substantially increased risk of CTD development in workers. 97 While
OSHA has no duty to calculate the exact probability of harm, 98 these
studies suggest that a significant risk exists that workers in highly repetitive, highly forceful jobs will develop CTDs. 99 Other evidence,
however, suggests that no motion, harmless in itself, can produce
physiological damage in a worker from mere repetition. 100 Yet, be94. 448 U.S. at 656. This assertion is supported by the Act, which provides that, while
OSHA's findings must be based on substantial evidence, OSHA can act on the basis of the best
available evidence. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5), (t) (1988).
95. 448 U.S. at 656. The Court's language restricts this freedom to "interpreting ••• data
with respect to carcinogens." 448 U.S. at 656. The general reasoning, however, supports a potential analogy to other frontier-oriented illnesses or injuries, such as CTDs. In Industrial Union,
the Secretary failed to carry his initial burden of establishing a significant risk even with this
leeway because he relied on his own special policy for carcinogens that imposed this burden on
industry. 448 U.S. at 659. The Court rejected this approach. 448 U.S. at 659, 662.
96. For example, this conclusion may be less speculative than were the doctor's assumptions
in extrapolating human risk from animal risk in Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)
1l 27,643, at 35,979-80 (July 23, 1986).
97. See, e.g., Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 832. This study, evaluating the relationship
between repetitiveness, forcefulness, and various CTDs, found a "highly significant association"
between CTDs and the repetitiveness and forcefulness of manual work. Id. Similar, although
less conclusive, results were obtained in a study of a meatpacking plant. See Masear et al., supra
note 10, at 225.
98. "[T)he requirement that a 'significant' risk be identified is not a mathematical straightjacket." 448 U.S. at 655.
99. Participants of Silverstein's study included 652 workers in 39 jobs from seven different
industrial sites. Categorizing the occupations into four exposure groups based on high or low
repetitiveness and forcefulness, Silverstein found that the "high force-high repetitive" group had
more than 15 times the risk of having carpal tunnel syndrome on interview and physical examination as the "low force-low repetitive" group. Silverstein et al., supra note 5, at 349-50. Analysis of the "low force-high repetitive group" and the "high force-low repetitive" group showed
repetitiveness to be a more important risk factor than force. Id. at 350. Masear's study, while
less comprehensive, found a similarly striking increase in the incidence of carpal tunnel syndrome at the meatpacking plant being observed (14.8%) over that of the general population
(1%). Masear et al., supra note 10, at 226.
100. See, e.g., Hadler, supra note 5, at 454. Hadler asserts that there is no evidence that
repetitive motion can cause an actual injury or anything other than "use-associated arm discomfort." See id. His conclusion that repetitive occupational usages pose no significant risk to workers is summarized by Huvelle and Michaelson, who quote Hadler for the proposition that "there
is precious little data to suggest that such usage increases the likelihood of symptoms [of repetitive stress injuries] beyond that found in ordinary living." Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17,
at 25.
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cause a "body of reputable scientific thought" embraces the position
that repetitive and forceful motions pose a significant risk of CTDs,
OSHA should be able to meet this requirement of the general duty
clause.IOI
B.

Recognition of Hazard

OSHA must next show that the hazard is "recognized."I 02 Recognized hazard is a term of art with a meaning both peculiar to the Act
and counterintuitive. I03 The term embodies two separate aspects. I04
First, a hazard is "recognized" only if the particular employer or its
industry knows it to be hazardous. Ios For example, the Eleventh Circuit has held that all construction-industry employers are charged
with knowledge that any "dry" manhole, twenty-four feet deep and
four feet wide, is a potential hazard; this knowledge satisfies the "recognition" requirement. I06 Knowledge of the hazard is a matter of objective determination. I07 OSHA must show that experts in the
industry would regard the prevention of the hazard as necessary and
valuable for a sound safety program. Ios
Second, a hazard is "recognized" only if it is preventable. I09 This
restriction ensures that the general duty is achievable. IIo A hazard is
101. While the OSHRC has held the Supreme Court's significant risk test applicable to general duty clause cases, it has done little to give substance to that test. The test would certainly be
met under the considerable leeway given to OSHA for situations on the frontiers of science. See
supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. The outcome is unclear, however, if the courts will
not extend that freedom beyond the context of carcinogens.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988); see National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d
1257, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
103. Congress vigorously debated inclusion of the term. Representative Steiger, for example,
argued for "readily apparent" language because "recognized hazard" was so broad and ambiguous as to be "patently unfair." See 116 CoNG. R.Ec. 38,371-72 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger).
104. Some cases also recognize a third element: the significance of the risk of harm. In U.S.
Steel Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1127,517, at 35,669-70 (Mar. 4, 1986), the OSHRC
noted that while it was agreed that molten metal in contact with water presents a hazard of
explosions in some circumstances, the hazard is nevertheless "recognized" only when the amount
of water that can become encapsulated by the molten metal is great enough to make the risk
significant. This occasional use of a third element adds to the difficulty of determining the content of recognized hazard.
105. E.g., Continental Oil Co. v. OSHRC, 630 F.2d 446, 448 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 965 (1981); Davey Tree Expert Co., 1983-1984 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1126,852, at 34,399
(Mar. 30, 1984).
106. Ed Taylor Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 938 F.2d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 1991).
107. 116 CONG. R.Ec. 38,377 (1970) (statement of Rep. Daniels).
108. See Cerro Metal Prods. Div., Marmon Group, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)
11 27,579, at 35,829 (May 7, 1986).
109. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(noting that Congress did not intend unpreventable hazards to be considered "recognized" under
the clause). Congress also did not intend to make unpreventable instances of hazards "recognized,'' even when the hazard itself is generally recognized. See Cerro Metal Prods. Div.,
Marmon Group, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1127,579, at 35,829 (May 7, 1986).
110. See National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1265-66. Restricting the duty to preventable hazards is
also the only way to promote the Act's goals of notice and fairness. See infra notes 179-80, 205,
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not preventable, and therefore not recognized, "if it is so idiosyncratic
and implausible ... that conscientious experts, familiar with the industry, would not take it into account in prescribing a safety program." 111
While an employer's duty is not diminished because a hazard was directly caused by an employee, certain events, such as equipment-riding
in contravention of company policy, would be hazards which might
not be "recognized" - demented or reckless employees may circumvent even "the best conceived and most vigorously enforced safety regime."112 Additionally, a hazard is neither preventable nor
"recognized" if its elimination would require methods that are so untested or so expensive that experts would consider them infeasible. 113
CTDs fail to satisfy the "recognition" requirement. Voluntary
ergonomics programs instituted by some employers do not constitute
industry recognition of CTDs as a workplace hazard; such programs
merely constitute a factor in the necessary objective determination. 114
As CTDs increasingly become a part of common knowledge, however,
an employer's claim that its industry does not have knowledge of the
potential hazards of repetitive motions will become less plausible.
Increasing general awareness of CTDs, however, will not similarly
affect the second aspect of "recognition," preventability, because of
and accompanying text. Imposing liability for unpreventable hazards would be to impose a system of strict liability with an unachievable duty of care. This was clearly not Congress' intent.
489 F.2d at 1265-66.
111. 489 F.2d at 1266.
112. 489 F.2d at 1266 & n.36.
113. 489 F.2d at 1266 & n.37; see also Morey, supra note 39, at 993 (concluding that employ·
ers should be allowed the defense that elimination of a hazard is physically or economically
impossible absent termination of operations); infra note 214 and accompanying text. An exam·
ple of such a non-"recognized" hazard can be found in Pelron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec.
(CCH) ff 27,605, at 35,872 (June 2, 1986) (hazard of unreacted, explosive chemicals in pressure
vessels is not "recognized" because the condition is so common in the industry that no measures,
short of closing down, could eliminate it). See infra notes 116-19.
Applying these technical restrictions may lead to seemingly incongruent results. For exam·
ple, there may be a harmful condition that constitutes a hazard and is not covered by a promulgated standard, but to which the general duty clause does not apply because the hazard is not
"recognized." While this result may seem to leave workers unprotected, it is entirely consistent
with the Act's purpose. Employee protection is not the Act's exclusive goal - protection should
be sought only when it can be achieved effectively, efficiently, and equitably. See supra note 32
and accompanying text.
Policy considerations sometimes determine whether or not the general duty clause should
apply. For example, Morey notes the importance of the fact that, "despite the Act's solicitude
for employee welfare," the general duty clause is subject to restrictions such as imposing liability
only for preventable hazards. See Morey, supra note 39, at 992. His reference to preventability
implicates issues of fairness and notice. See also BOKAT, supra note 58, at 108 ("Despite the
breadth of the general duty clause, it does not ... render the employer a guarantor of employee
safety and health ••.•").
114. If a recognized hazard were found solely because an employer took certain precautions
to avoid that hazard, employers would be discouraged from voluntarily taking any protective
measures not required by law. Moreover, employers may take voluntary safety measures out of
an "abundance of caution" rather than out of recognition of a hazard. Such precautions, volun·
tarily taken, do not prove that an employer would violate the general duty clause if it did not take
them. See Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ff 27,643, at 35,975 (July 23, 1986).
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the continuing medical controversies surrounding CTDs. Given the
current state of scientific knowledge, the preventive value of interventionary measures for CTDs is at best uncertain.1 15 If CTDs are unpreventable, prosecution of employers under the general duty clause is
unfair: it penalizes employers for failing to fulfill an unachievable
duty.
In Pelron Corp., 116 the court addressed the propriety of a general
duty citation for a broadly defined hazard - "the possibility of accumulations of unreacted ethylene oxide in pressure vessels." 117 Pelron
Corporation, a chemicals producer, manufactured its products by mixing either ethylene oxide or propylene oxide with other chemicals in
chemical reactors, always with the "possibility" that unreacted ethylene oxide would accumulate. 118 In vacating the citation, the OSHRC
found that some industrial activities are dangerous by nature, involving risks inherent in the conduct of business:
To permit the normal activities in . . . an industry to be defined as a
"recognized hazard" within the meaning of [the general duty clause] is
... almost to prove the Secretary's case by definition, since under such a
formula the employer can never free the workplace of inherent risks incident to the business.119

By this reasoning, because CTDs allegedly develop from normal occupational tasks that are central both to workers' jobs and to their employers' business, CTDs may fail the "recognition" requirement
because they are a risk "incident to the business."
CTDs may also fail the "recognition" requirement because of the
high cost of implementing OSHA's abatement orders. 120 Even if
OSHA's vague and unproven orders, such as job analysis by an ergonomics committee, 121 can be considered sufficiently effective in
preventing CTDs, a hazard requiring an abatement method that
threatens the economic viability of employers should not be considered "recognized." 122 Such a hazard should. instead be remedied
115. After a comprehensive study, Armstrong, for example, concluded that "the effectiveness
of preventive job design is still to be demonstrated." Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 835. A
more detailed discussion of the results of studies of the value of preventive measures appears in
the subsection concerning the "feasibility of abatement method" requirement. See infra section
11.C.
116. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 11 27,605 (June 2, 1986).
117. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,871 (emphasis added).
118. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,870-71.
119. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,872.
120. Compliance with OSHA's abatement orders often costs millions of dollars. See infra
note 213 and accompanying text.
121. Ford Motor Company Agrees, supra note 77. Studies indicate that such interventionary
measures have no significant impact on the reduction of CTDs. See infra notes 133-41 and
accompanying text.
122. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 & n.37 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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through the promulgation process.
C. Feasibility of Abatement Method

OSHA must also demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of
specific abatement measures to prove a general duty violation. 123 In
effect, OSHA must demonstrate what the cited employer should have
done to reduce the risk of harm, 124 specifying the particular measures
that the employer should have taken to avoid citation. 125 In addition,
OSHA must demonstrate that safety experts would regard its proposed abatement method as "necessary and valuable for a sound safety
program in the particular circumstances existing at the employer's
worksite." 126 Evidence that an abatement method is not feasible may
include, for example, proof of the idiosyncratic or implausible nature
of the hazard or evidence that the abatement method is untested or
overly expensive.121
In John Gill Ranch, 12s which presented facts similar to those in
CTD cases, OSHA had cited an employer under the general duty
clause because its employees worked in stooped postures while pulling
weeds by hand in a spinach field. 129 Although the OSHRC found that
working in such a posture was a recognized hazard in California, 130 it
123. See Pelron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ff 27,605, at 35,871 (June 2, 1986). A
satisfactory abatement measure may be designed either to eliminate the hazard or, where appropriate, materially to reduce the hazard. See 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,871. OSHA
must necessarily establish both the feasibility and the utility of the abatement method. See, e.g.,
FMC Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ff 27,686, at 36,118 (Aug. 28, 1986) (finding that,
while "the Secretary established the feasibility of relocating the [nitrogen trichloride transfer]
lines [to reduce the danger of explosion from exposure to high temperatures], ••• the evidence
fail[ed) to establish the likely utility of this abatement measure").
124. For example, in FMC Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ff 27,686 (Aug. 28, 1986),
the OSHRC found the lack of a formal training program insufficient proof that FMC's informal
training methods were inadequate; the Secretary had to prove in addition that any suggested
formalization of the training process would materially reduce the risk of harm. "The question is
one of substance, not form." 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 36,116-17.
125. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
126. Cerro Metal Prods. Div., Marmon Group, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)
ff 27,579, at 35,829 (May 7, 1986). "The question is whether a precaution is recognized by safety
experts as feasible ••.." National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1266 n.37. In Pelron Corp., 1986-1987
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ff 27,605 (June 2, 1986), the OSHRC vacated a general duty citation because,
while the Secretary criticized Pelron's established safety program as inadequate, 1986-1987
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,873-74, he failed to prove that safety experts in the field would have
prescribed additional training measures that would have materially reduced the risk of harm and
therefore failed to show the feasibility and likely utility of an abatement method. 1986-1987
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,872.
127. See National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1266.
128. 1987-1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ff 28,796 (Nov. 1, 1986).
129. Working in an awkward position is sometimes stated as a factor possibly contributing to
CTDs. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note l, at 292. The case is treated as merely analogous to
CTDs, however, because posture has been found insignificant in the development of CTDs, see
Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 832, and because the reported decision does not refer to CTDs.
130. John Gill Ranch, 1987-1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 38,391. Hazards usually are defined
narrowly and have restrictions on the "recognition" element, most commonly by industry. See,
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vacated the citation because the Secretary failed to prove that use of a
long-handled hoe was a feasible means of abatement. Specifically, the
Secretary failed to demonstrate that safety experts in the agriculture
industry would regard a long-handled hoe as necessary and appropriate for spinach cultivation. 131 Instead, the evidence showed that a
long-handled hoe would destroy the spinach crop and enhance weed
growth by displacing herbicide and was, therefore, infeasible. In addition, a long-handled hoe would not necessarily reduce stooped work
because of the need to remove weeds after harvesting.132
The occupational factors that allegedly cause CTDs present the
same sort of difficulties for OSHA abatement orders as those found in
John Gill Ranch. The lack of definitive scientific evidence regarding
the effect of interventionary measures on the development of CTDs 133
prevents OSHA from formulating a demonstrably feasible and useful
means of abatement. Silverstein's comprehensive study of occupational CTDs, examining whether the elimination of any work-related
risk factors 134 leads to a reduction in the incidence of CTDs, found
that the implementation of ergonomics interventions over a three-year
period caused no statistically significant improvements in CTDs. 135
Others studying the problem have reached similar conclusions. 136 The
strongest statement from the major studies is that certain measures
"may" reduce the incidence of CTDs.1 37
OSHA's abatement orders for CTDs fail the feasibility requirement. These orders typically include broad recommendations for improving ergonomics practices across all aspects of an employer's
operations, leaving specific application to the employer. 138 When
e.g., St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. OSHRC, 647 F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 1981) (permitting a freight
elevator to operate with the doors and gates open is a recognized hazard in the lead smelting
industry). John Gill Ranch's restriction on hazard "recognition" to California is not
extraordinary.
131. John Gill Ranch, 1987-1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 38,391.
132. 1987-1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 38,391.
133. See, e.g., Masear et al., supra note 10, at 226 (concluding, after a study of the potential
causes of carpal tunnel syndrome with a view toward instituting preventive measures, that "[t]he
major question is still unresolved. If the work environment is responsible for this high incidence
of [carpal tunnel syndrome], how must this be changed to resolve the problem?").
134. Work-related risk factors for CTDs include repetitiveness, forcefulness, awkward posture, and vibration. Silverstein et al., supra note 7, at 838.
135. Id. at 844.
136. See Armstrong et al., supra note 2, at 835 (emphasizing that "the effectiveness of preventive job design is still to be demonstrated"); Masear et al., supra note 10, at 226 (stating that
the question of preventive measures is "still unresolved"). While claiming that ergonomics intervention is a "pressing need," Hadler warns that such intervention in Australia over a period of
five years has had, with rare exception, no discernible impact on slowing the dramatic increase in
CTDs. Hadler, supra note 5, at 454-55.
137. Silverstein et al., supra note 5, at 356. The authors note that their findings can be helpful in directing workplace interventions because they suggest a prevention strategy: intervention
at the job level. This strategy, however, lacks practical direction due to its generality.
138. See Freeman, supra note 29, at 28.
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Ford Motor Company settled its general duty citation with OSHA, for
example, Ford agreed to implement an ergonomics program involving
such measures as job-analysis by joint labor-management ergonomics
committees, engineering controls, a medical management program,
and employee training and education. 139 These agreements are neither
hazard-specific nor even employer-specific but rather are a "broad recipe for CTD reduction" lacking practical direction. 140 The unresolved
medical questions concerning causation and prevention not only keep
OSHA from issuing more refined abatement orders, but also make it
difficult for OSHA to ensure that its broad orders will have the predicted result. 141
In the context of CTDs, OSHA is unable to address specific
problems through abatement orders because particular methods will
likely prove infeasible. 142 For example, job rotation, which is a common1y cited preventive measure, 143 is usually infeasible in an industrial
setting because of the seniority required in most industries to obtain a
job change. 144 Moreover, a decrease in the production rate or a decrease in repetitions per shift to ease the strain on workers is usually
infeasible because of the industrial employer's need for a high production rate from each employee to make a profit. 145
If OSHA instead issues a broad order, employers will be able to
satisfy the general duty clause too easily. An employer can fulfill
much of OSHA's order by maintaining a basic employee training program and a staff engineer who implements limited ergonomics suggestions.146 If OSHA cites an employer who has implemented these
modest programs, OSHA has the virtually impossible task of proving
that any incremental increase in the stringency of the programs will
have a material impact on the reduction of CTDs. 147 Given the lack
139. Ford Motor Company Agrees, supra note 77.
140. Freeman, supra note 29, at 28.
141. See id.
142. This criticism assumes that OSHA possesses the physical capability to make particular·
ized orders; it probably does not. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., George Lutz & Terri Hansford, Cumulative Trauma Disorder Controls: The
Ergonomics Program at Ethicon, Inc., 12 J. HAND SURGERY 863, 864 (1987) (stating that job
rotation is a common job modification in Ethicon's voluntary ergonomics program).
144. See Masear et al., supra note 10, at 226.
145. Id.
146. See Freeman, supra note 29, at 28. Thus, employers can satisfy OSHA's abatement
orders despite the lack of objective scientific evidence that such measures are effective. See supra
notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
147. The difficulty of succeeding with such proof can be seen in general duty clause cases in
other contexts. In one case, for example, the OSHRC stated that "[i]f an employer has a safety
program designed to eliminate a recognized hazard, the burden is on the Secretary to 'specify the
[additional] steps a cited employer should have taken to avoid citation, and to demonstrate the
feasibility and likely utility of those measures.'" Cerro Metal Prods. Div., Marmon Group, Inc.,
1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,579, at 35,829 (May 7, 1986) (quoting National Realty &
Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). The OSHRC held that the
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of evidence that these broad programs effectively reduce CTDs,
OSHA will inevitably fail to carry its burden of proof under the general duty clause.
Even if these difficulties are met, OSHA's abatement orders are
demonstrably very costly to implement. 148 While the most profitable
employers may be able to afford such programs, employers with fewer
resources will be less able to comply and may thus be forced out of
business. In a situation such as this, the general duty clause is an inappropriate means to enforce the Act. 149
OSHA's inability to articulate a demonstrably feasible abatement
method for CTDs, however, does not undercut the viability of an ergonomics standard. The promulgation process provides the Secretary
with more resources than are available to OSHA, including access to
extensive research and commentary on the hazard. 150 This process
presents the better means of discovering an abatement method for
CTDs, if one exists. If one does not exist, the promulgation process
still provides a more attractive alternative than the general duty clause
because it will produce a more comprehensive and mutually agreeable
solution to the problem.151

D. Causation of Death or Serious Physical Harm
Finally, the hazard must cause or be likely to cause death or serious physical harm to sustain a general duty violation. 152 This requirement embodies two independent elements: the causation of the hazard
and the seriousness of the hazard. Causation of a hazard cannot be
reduced to a mathematical test 153 - the proper test is one of plausibility, not probability. 154 The proper standard of review is whether
Secretary failed to carry this burden and vacated the citation. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at
35,829; see also Pelron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1127,605, at 35,870 (June 2, 1986)
(vacating a general duty citation because the Secretary failed to establish that the risk could have
been materially reduced by changes in Pe!ron's training program); FMC Corp., 1986-1987
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 11 27,686, at 36,116 (Aug. 28, 1986) (finding that the Secretary failed to
establish that FMC's training methods were inadequate and vacating a general duty citation).
148. Companywide ergonomics programs often cost millions of dollars. See infra note 213
and accompanying text. The programs involved in these statistics are those that an employer
must implement to comply with a valid general duty citation. They are more substantial than the
minimal measures that would be sufficient to prevent OSHA from sustaining a general duty
citation in the first place. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
149. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.37 (D.C. Cir.
1973); see also infra text accompanying notes 212-14.
150. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(l)-(3) (1988). OSHA's ability to conduct research and formulate
abatement orders is restricted by its relatively small size and limited resources. See infra note
197 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
152. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988); see Pelron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1127,605,
at 35,871 (June 2, 1986).
153. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.33 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
154. Morey, supra note 39, at 997-98 (noting that the most sensible test is "whether reason-
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workplace conditions could cause serious physical harm upon "other
than a freakish or utterly implausible concurrence of
circumstances." 155
While significant questions of causation may persist, 156 the causation element presents a low hurdle for CTDs. Given the extraordinary
number of repetitive motions that many employees must perform, 157
the causal link between such usages and the development of CTDs can
sensibly be described as plausible, and is by no means implausible or
"freakish." For example, the Seventh Circuit has stated that "drawing
a reasonable inference of causation [in a case involving the sufficiency
of evidence in a complaint alleging neck and wrist injuries from working on an assembly line] does not necessarily require more 'expertise'
than deciding that leaking sewer gases are unhealthy or that objects
that are stacked too high create a danger to the employees below." 158
CTDs, however, most likely fail the general duty clause's "seriousness" element. The clause only protects against hazards that are causing or are likely to cause "death or serious physical harm." 15 9
According to OSHA's own definition, a serious physical harm is one
in which part of the body is made "functionally useless" or is "subably foreseeable circumstances could lead to the perceived hazard's resulting in serious physical
harm or death"). Questions remain, however, as to which standard will be used in any particular
case. See BoKAT, supra note 58, at 113, 132.
155. National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1265 n.33. The explanation for the exemption of freakish
mishaps from statutory liability is one of policy: because the goal of the Act is preventive and
not remedial, In re Establishment Inspection of Midwest Instruments Co., 900 F.2d 1150, 1153
(7th Cir. 1990), liability should not attach to unforeseeable or "freakish" injuries because such
responsive action serves no useful preventive purpose; although "caused" by the workplace conditions, they are unpreventable. See Morey, supra note 39, at 1001.
156. Causation problems emanate from the number and variety of potential contributing
causal factors. See, e.g., Silverstein et al., supra note 5, at 343 (listing potential occupational and
nonoccupational factors for carpal tunnel syndrome). Some experts find a strong association
between CTDs and occupational repetitiveness and forcefulness. See id. at 353 (finding that
repetitiveness and forcefulness were strongly associated with carpal tunnel syndrome as risk factors); see supra note 99. Others, however, insist that little scientific proof exists that occupation is
a significant risk factor. See, e.g., Hadler, supra note 12, at 39 (finding no relation between
occupational usage and disorders of the forearm, shoulder, elbow and neck).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
158. In re Establishment Inspection of Midwest Instruments Co., 900 F.2d 1150, 1154 (7th
Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). While the standard of causation involved in that case is the administrative probable cause necessary for securing an inspection warrant, which requires less
evidence of causation than does proof of a violation of the Act, see West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v.
Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 958 (11th Cir. 1982), the Seventh Circuit's view of the intuitive relation
between repetitive occupational usages and CTDs should satisfy the plausibility required by the
"causation" element of the general duty clause.
159. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (1988). Huvelle and Michaelson claim that by using the phrase
"death or serious physical harm," Congress intended to restrict the general duty clause to
hazards that were at least potentially deadly. Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 25. While
the case Jaw seems to support this contention, OSHA's manual apparently rejects it. See OSHA,
REVISED FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL IV-21, IV-22 (1989) (listing such factors as "bone fracture" among those that can constitute serious physical harm); infra note 160. The legislative
history is inconclusive.
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stantially reduced in efficiency." 160
The case law reveals the high degree of seriousness required under
the clause. For example, a sixty-foot fall hazard caused by an employer allowing an employee to wear a tom and frayed safety belt
while working outside a wire rope guardrail is likely to cause death or
serious physical harm. 161 Permitting work on slippery platforms approximately five feet above a roadway, by comparison, is not. 162 Flying metal fragments launched by a steel mill coiler twenty feet from
maintenance workers are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm. 163 Failing to protect employees, working with molten metal in
95-degree fahrenheit temperatures, from the effects of heat stress is
also likely to cause death or serious physical harm. 164 Assaults from
mental patients, by contrast, which inflict scratches, bruises, bites,
hairpulling, broken blood veins, choking, bruised eyeballs, concussions, sprained shoulders, and swollen arms, are not likely to cause
death or serious physical harm.16s
While CTDs sometimes impair sensory, autonomic, and motor
functions, and occasionally result in permanent disabilities, extreme
injury is rare. The variety of CTDs and their associated symptoms
have been described as "discomforts." 166 While that label may trivialize these conditions, the fact that CTDs lack the life-threatening gravity167 found in the case law suggests that CTDs are not the type of
serious injury that Congress intended to protect against with the general duty clause. 168 Nor can the recent dramatic rise in the number of
reported CTDs alone satisfy the seriousness element. Other explanations may account for the increase, such as recent changes in record160. OSHA, REVISED FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL IV-21 (1989). The manual cites several
examples of injuries that can constitute serious physical harm: amputation; concussion; internal
crushing; bone fracture; bum; and cut, laceration, or puncture involving significant bleeding or
requiring suturing. Id. at IV-21, IV-22.
161. Greer Architectural Prods., Inc., 1987-1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 28,601 (June 2,
1989).
162. Mohican Trucking Co., 1980 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 24,514 (May 27, 1980).
163. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 1980 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 24,724 (Aug. 13, 1980).
164. Duriron Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 750 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir. 1984). The court reasoned
that heat exhaustion could cause an employee to faint and fall against molten metal or moving
machinery. 750 F.2d at 30.
165. Meier v. Department of Social Servs., 1979 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 23,324 (Feb. 8, 1979).
166. See Hadler, supra note 5, at 454 (claiming that CTDs of the arms are responsible merely
for "mild to modest transitory nuisance"); see also supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Hadler, supra note 12, at 38 (asserting that CTDs do not cause any specific
musculoskeletal damage). Hadler, after reviewing the results of Silverstein's research, notes that
the Jack of any irreversible structural change in use-related tendinitis suggests that the condition
would more appropriately be labeled "wrist soreness." Id. at 39.
168. See Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 25 (concluding that since CTDs that disable or debilitate are the exception rather than the rule, case Jaw and common sense clearly
reveal that they are not the type of serious injury intended to be protected against by the general
duty clause). For an explanation of the various types of CTDs suffered, see supra notes 11-13
and accompanying text.
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keeping requirements. 169 While some CTDs genuinely disable their
victims, CTDs as a whole probably fail to satisfy the "seriousness"
requirement.
Because CTDs fail to satisfy the general duty clause's four-part
test, OSHA should not be allowed to use the clause to prosecute employers for CTDs. The absence of an ergonomics standard fails to
justify reliance on the clause for CTDs; the clause was not intended to
substitute for standards. 170 Promulgated standards are the appropriate remedy and the Secretary should initiate that process if a remedy is
warranted. 171
III. THE .ARGUMENT FOR AN ERGONOMICS STANDARD
OSHA's use of the general duty clause despite the failure of CTDs
to satisfy the clause's requirements has consequences beyond those of
a simple technical violation of the law. By continuing to use the clause
for CTDs, OSHA undermines the Act's basic policy goals. These
goals dictate a different course of action that would not only uphold
the Act's policies but also better achieve the purpose of protecting
workers. This Part argues that the policy goals of the Act require the
Secretary to promulgate an ergonomics standard to protect workers
from CTDs. Section III.A demonstrates that OSHA's use of the general duty clause to prosecute alleged ergonomics violations is ineffective and unfair. The promulgation process, however, provides OSHA
the means to develop a beneficial, consistent, and fair ergonomics standard that will protect workers as Congress intended.
Section III.B anticipates and responds to the criticism that cessation of prosecutions under the general duty clause would leave workers unprotected. This section argues that the policy reasons favoring
an ergonomics standard over application of the general duty clause
maintain their force even in the absence of a presently available ergonomics standard. This Part concludes that OSHA should stop prosecuting employers for alleged ergonomics violations under the general
duty clause and should instead promulgate an ergonomics standard.
169. In the late 1980s, OSHA began issuing huge fines for recordkeeping violations of the
Act. Out of fear of this new policy, employers began keeping very careful records of everything
that might be considered a CTD. Then "[w]hat happened was OSHA suddenly said, Look, you
have all these reported cases of cumulative trauma disorders. Therefore, you have knowledge of
a hazard in your workplace and that satisfies the recognized hazard element." Malovany, supra
note 17, at 30 (comments of Nina Stillman, attorney with the law firm representing Pepperidge
Farm in its challenge of a general duty citation). There is no sudden increase in the danger of
CTDs in workplaces, the argument continues, and what has been characterized as a sudden,
serious phenomenon can be viewed as merely "a classic case of bootstrapping." Id.
170. BoKAT, supra note 58, at 109.
171. See infra section III.A.
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The Underlying Policies of the Act

Three specific policies provide the basis for the primary enforcement role of promulgated standards: notice, consistency, and fairness.
The promulgation process, unlike the general duty clause, provides the
Secretary with a means to address the special problems of CTDs while
upholding the policies of the Act.
1. Notice

Promulgated standards provide clear guidance to OSHA inspectors investigating for violations 172 and provide notice to employers
protecting against violations. 173 Concerned that the complexities of
modem industry would obfuscate what is expected of employers, Congress designed the promulgation mechanism to provide employers
with a degree of certainty with respect to both the content of their
obligations and the process by which their obligations are determined.174 Arguing for the merits of promulgating specific standards,
Representative Steiger explained that "[w]ith specific standards it will
be apparent to the employer what is expected and required ofhim." 175
Because of the "notice-and-comment" provisions of the Act's promulgation procedures, 176 a specific ergonomics standard would be the
subject of public debate. All interested parties could fashion an acceptable, well-informed, 177 and comprehensive standard, taking into
account CTDs' controversial medical issues. 178 By notifying employ172. 116 CoNG. REc. 38,371 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger) ("[S]pecific standards will
. . • serve as the necessary guide for inspectors in properly carrying out their investigatory
duties.").
173. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 36, at 252.
174. See 116 CoNG. REc. 38,371 (1970) ("It is exactly this complexity [in today's highly
technical industrial circumstances], and the uncertainty which often goes with it, that has led us
to provide carefully designed procedures for issuing specific safety and health standards.") (statement of Rep. Steiger). The procedures require, in part, that the Secretary of Labor publish all
proposed rules promulgating specific standards in the Federal Register. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(2)
(1988). Publishing in the Federal Register has been held to constitute notice to all employers.
See, e.g., Ed Taylor Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 938 F.2d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the OSHA "confined space" regulation has put the construction industry on notice that any
"sanitary" or "dry" manhole that is 24 feet deep and four feet wide is a potential hazard and that
all construction employers are charged with knowledge of the regulation and are responsible for
compliance); North Ala. Express, Inc. v. United States, 585 F.2d 783, 787 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978)
("Assuming that the contents of the published notice are otherwise complete, it is well settled
that publications in the Federal Register are deemed legally sufficient notice to all interested
persons."). Another important part of the promulgation procedures is the opportunity for public
hearings, comments, and objections by interested parties. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1)-(3) (1988).
175. 116 CoNG. REc. 38,371 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger).
176. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1)-(3) (1988) (providing for the opportunity to comment on, submit
data about, and register objections to a proposed standard).
177. Standards are to be based on "research, experiments, demonstrations, past experience,
and the latest available scientific data." S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted
in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5183.
178. Huvelle and Michaelson prefer this notice-and-comment approach of promulgated standards to the general duty clause because it would enable OSHA to resolve the difficult issues
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ers of their responsibilities, an ergonomics standard would enable employers to take direct and specific measures to protect the safety and
health of their workers, thus achieving the main goal of the Act.
From a policy standpoint, the shortcomings of the general duty
clause with respect to CTDs demonstrate the wisdom of Congress' decision to emphasize the promulgation of standards to deal with even
new harmful conditions. Absent an ergonomics standard, employers
have no notice as to what steps to take to reduce CTDs. Prosecution
under the general duty clause subjects employers to liability for a
"wrong" which they may not know how to correct. 179 The OSHRC
recognizes this deficiency of the general duty clause: "Reliance upon
the general duty clause [is] discouraged because to do so would provide little advanced warning of what specifically is required in order
that employers could maintain a safe and healthful workplace." 180 Because employers do not know what is required of them to maintain a
workplace free of CTDs, their employees' safety and health depend
upon whether their employer "guesses correctly" as to an acceptable
prevention method 181 or is willing to implement the universe of potential preventive actions. Neither condition is likely to occur.
Only through the promulgation of an ergonomics standard, resulting from a comprehensive and informed debate, can a definitive and
useful method of reducing the number and severity of workplace
CTDs be formulated, made known to employers, and revised and improved as medical knowledge develops. The general duty clause provides no equally well-reasoned solution to the CTD problem.
2.

Consistency

CTDs affect workers across a range of industries, from meatpacking to manufacturing to microtechnology. 182 All jobs involving repetitive tasks are likely to have a higher incidence of CTDs. 183 To be
concerning CTDs, such as causation, prevention, and the extent of harm caused. See Huvelle &
Michaelson, supra note 17, at 25. But cf RONALD A. CASS & COLIN s. DIVER, ADMINISTRA·
TIVE LAW 15 (1987) (noting that promulgation under the Act can be "excruciatingly slow and
extraordinarily expensive").
179. Huvelle and Michaelson state that "it is far from clear precisely what is expected of
employers." Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 24. Because OSHA has proceeded under
the general duty clause instead of issuing a standard, "[e]mployers are ..• hard pressed to know
how to tcy to reduce CTDs." Id.
180. Brisk Waterproofing Co., 1973-1974 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 16,345, at 21,261 (July 27,
1973). Referring to reliance on the general duty clause when no notice is available, the OSHRC
concluded that "the purposes of the Act would be ill served by such a situation." 1973-1974
O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 21,261.
181. See Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 25.
182. Other frequently-cited industries include the food processing, automobile parts, electronics assembly, and newspaper industries, as well as white-collar businesses, both high-tech and
low-tech. Id. at 24.
183. Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 293; see Silverstein et al., supra note 5, at 353.
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effective, the means of reducing and preventing CTDs must serve various occupations in a range of distinctly different workplaces.
Congress intended to remedy the consequences of inconsistencies
in workplace conditions existent in pre-Act industry by imposing uniform safety and health standards. 184 An ergonomics standard for general industry would clarify the duty of all relevant employers 185 and
require compliance. 186 By extending protection to all employees, an
ergonomics standard would effectuate the Act's purpose of assuring
safe and healthful workplaces so far as possible and would establish a
uniformity of workplace ergonomics conditions currently lacking. 187
One difficulty with protecting against CTDs is their occurrence in
varied industries. An ergonomics standard can overcome this obstacle. Through the extensive research provisions of the Act, 188 the Secretary has at her disposal the resources most likely to identify the
equipment, tasks, or other relevant factors that seem to cause CTDs
and through which she will most likely be able to formulate an appropriate standard. 189 Applicability would depend on manufacturing operations and uses of various technologies. Through this process, an
ergonomics standard would systematically cover all workplaces that
present a significant risk 190 of causing CTDs. 19 1
The general duty clause, by contrast, fails to account for the widespread incidence of CTDs because OSHA does not, and probably can184. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177,
5218 (individual views of Senator Javits) (recognizing the inadequate protection provided by
leaving workplace safety and health to private industry and the states, and the resulting need for
a strong federal program).
185. The Secretary has the capacity to promulgate standards that apply to any number of
industries. See BOKAT, supra note 58, at 65, 167 {discussing the distinction between "vertical"
and "horizontal" standards). The term relevant employers refers to those employers in the industries to which an ergonomics standard would apply.
186. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1988); see Ed Taylor Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 938 F.2d 1265,
1272 (11th Cir. 1991) Qtolding that all employers to whom a duly promulgated standard applies
are "responsible for compliance").
187. For example, while most noncited employers have no significant program, those employers faced with multimillion dollar fines typically settle and agree to implement some sort of
ergonomics program. See, e.g., CAL/OSHA Issue Special Order on VDT Use at San Diego Newspaper, Reaches Settlement Agreement on VDT Safety with Fresno Newspaper, [1990 Transfer
Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) ~ 10,631, at 13,497 {describing the terms of Fresno
Bee's joint ergonomics agreement with OSHA). In some cases, however, an employer might
voluntarily adopt an ergonomics program without first being cited. See, e.g., Lutz & Hansford,
supra note 143 (describing Ethicon's self-imposed ergonomics program); Ford Motor Company
Agrees, supra note 77 (discussing Ford Motor Co.'s settled ergonomics agreement).
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(l)-(3) (1988).
189. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. Reference to a single ergonomics standard is not intended to preclude the possibility - and probability - of multiple ergonomics
standards. See supra note 33.
190. The Secretary may promulgate a standard for any hazard that poses a significant risk of
harm. See infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
191. See BOKAT, supra note 58, at 167-68 (discussing "specific" standards, which are applicable to particular equipment or operations).
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not, 19 2 apply it consistently. Despite Congress' admonition that the
general duty clause "should not be used to set ad hoc standards," 193
OSHA's use of the clause against employers such as IBP, Inc., Ford
Motor Company, and Perdue Farms 194 has prompted criticism that
OSHA is selectively prosecuting nationally prominent employers and
imposing excessive fines solely for media attention. 195 This misuse of
the general duty clause forgoes the benefits of consistency offered by
promulgated standards, which are preferred to "adventurous" enforcement of the clause. 196
Aside from OSHA's alleged motives, OSHA clearly does not have
the capacity to police and inspect all employers. 197 As a result, it must
choose which employers to target. 198 While the general duty clause
may have an impact on workplace conditions of employers cited by
OSHA, 199 other employers lack notice of what is expected to discharge
their general duty. 200 Reliance on ad hoc enforcement under the gen192. OSHA's size limitations affect its ability to enforce the general duty clause consistently
against all relevant employers. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
193. 116 CONG. REc. 42,206 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger); see also Kastalon, Inc.,
1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643, at 35,971 (July 23, 1986) (stating that specific standards
are preferred over the broad mandate of the general duty clause).
194. NIOSH Investigates Ergonomic Hazards at Poultry Processing Plants in North Carolina,
[1990 Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) ~ 10,592 (report of NIOSH investi·
gation of alleged ergonomics violations at Perdue Farms poultry processing plants).
195. "OSHA's strategy of imposing multi-million dollar fines in conjunction with vague and
untested means of abatement appear more designed to garner media attention and satisfy political pressures than to improve workers' safety in a prompt, efficient and effective manner."
House Hearings, supra note 6, at 28 (statement of Perdue Farms, Inc.); see also Malovany, supra
note 17, at 30 (employer's attorney claiming that the recent increase in penalty amounts for
general duty violations for CTDs was the result of "a fundamental change in political winds on
the national level"). Whatever the validity of these claims, OSHA is aware of the publicity and
uses the high-profile aspect of its citations to influence the behavior of other employers. Huvelle
and Michaelson report that Gerard Scannell, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational
Safety and Health, commented that he wanted the 111 citations and $242,000 in penalties against
Cargill, Inc. (for exposing workers to CTDs) "to send a strong message" to employers. Huvelle
& Michaelson, supra note 17, at 24. While general deterrence is an accepted goal of punishment
in certain cases, the intended "message" in the case of CTDs remains confused and inarticulate
- without an ergonomics standard or any other definitive notice of how to protect against
CTDs, noncited employers are unable to conform their behavior to protect workers. See supra
notes 179-81 and accompanying text. The doubtful utility of its high-profile approach to enforce·
ment may cast doubt on the credibility of OSHA's general deterrence motives.
196. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.37 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
197. House Panel Hears Testimony on Cumulative Trauma Disorders, [1989 Transfer Binder]
Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) ~ 10,112, at 12,229 (June 6, 1989) (noting a criticism of the
number of OSHA's investigatory and enforcement personnel).
198. While stating that OSHA's inspections are "more or less systematic," Gross notes that
OSHA targets industries with above-average injury-frequency rates, the so-called "worst first"
approach to enforcement. Gross, supra note 36, at 257 n.52, 258 n.56.
199. In an ordinary general duty case, citations almost invariably improve the safety and
health of workplaces. For CTDs, however, the likely utility of any abatement method is still
uncertain. See supra section 11.C.
200. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
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eral duty clause likely results in some workers' being left unprotected, 201 thereby frustrating the purpose of the Act. Congress
recognized the undercutting effect on workplace safety and health arising from inconsistent programs: "[M]any employers - particularly
smaller ones - simply cannot make the necessary investment in
health and safety, and survive competitively, unless all are compelled
to do so. " 202 By providing a clear and consistent obligation for all
relevant employers, an ergonomics standard would increase the likelihood203 that the employees of noncited employers204 would be protected from CTDs.
3. Fairness

The controversy and uncertainty surrounding the causation of
CTDs and the means by which they can be reduced or eliminated
make prosecution under the general duty clause unfair. 205 Perhaps
even more significantly, enforcement under the clause often sacrifices
fair procedure. Currently, OSHA issues citations and proposed penalties to employers upon discovering levels of CTD exposure that OSHA
believes violate the general duty clause.206 OSHA has the authority
and, depending on how it categorizes the violation, the responsibility
to assess penalties of up to $70,000 for each violation.201 The citation
201. Given OSHA's tendency to prosecute large, prominent employers, the unprotected
workers will most likely be those of small to medium-sized employers. Voluntary ergonomics
agreements with these employers will probably be rare, often for economic reasons. See infra
note 202; cf. Lutz & Hansford, supra note 143, at 863 (stating that Ethicon, Inc., which entered a
voluntary ergonomics agreement, is the worldwide leading manufacturer of sutures and wound
closure products).
202. S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177,
5180. The need to offset this inconsistency with a standard is even more pronounced in the
context of CTDs because of their long latency period. "[W]here there is a long period between
exposure to a hazard and manifestation of an illness[,] .•. a particular employer has no economic
incentive to invest in current precautions ... because he will seldom have to pay for the consequences of his own neglect." Id.
203. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
204. Employees working for cited employers would also benefit from an ergonomics standard
because their employers would be able to take appropriate steps to avoid being cited again. Without an ergonomics standard, preemptive measures by any employer are, if not impossible, at least
undefined. See Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 24.
205. "[I]t is grossly unfair to employers to subject them to the possibility of a civil penalty for
not complying with a general requirement as vague as a mandate 'to do good and avoid evil.' "
116 CoNG. R.Ec. 38,371 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger).
206. 29 U.S.C. §§ 658(a), 659(a) (1988); see, e.g., Maakestad & Helm, supra note 12, at 10-11
(describing the citation of IBP, Inc. and John Morrell & Co. for ergonomics violations).
207. 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1991). This section of the Act prescribes different
penalties for "willful or repeated" violations, "serious" violations, and "not serious" violations.
OSHA has attempted to characterize most ergonomics violations as willful, the most serious kind
of violation. See Freeman, supra note 29, at 28. Any general duty violation must at least be a
"serious" violation. BOKAT, supra note 58, at 109. In addition, in egregious cases, OSHA has
begun calculating the imposed penalty by multiplying the statutory penalty by the number of
employees exposed to the CTD, resulting in the assessment of extraordinarily large fines. Freeman, supra note 29, at 28.
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and proposed penalty become final unless the employer contests their
legitimacy within the time provided.2os
The special characteristics of CTDs, however, negate the fairness
that Congress intended by this two-step process. Persistent uncertainties regarding possible means of abatement of CTDs render the Act's
appeal provisions ineffectual. Neither NIOSH, the Secretary of Labor's researching agency, nor most employers are confident of the preventive value of CTD interventionary measures, which are largely
untested. 209 While courts and the OSHRC may occasionally vacate a
citation because OSHA's abatement method was insuffi.cient, 210 reviewing bodies are poorly equipped to evaluate the utility of OSHA's
orders. Most cases settle before courts reach this determination. 211
Unless employers comply with OSHA's typically general and often arbitrary abatement orders,212 they are subjected to large penalties. In
addition to the uncertainties concerning the utility of OSHA's abatement orders, compliance often costs substantial sums of money. 213 Especially because CTD precautionary measures threaten the economic
viability of many employers, fairness dictates that OSHA should promulgate a standard in accordance with the Act's procedural safeguards. 214 An ergonomics standard would combat these uncertainties
with procedural scrutiny.21s
The OSHRC has emphasized the role of fairness in the promulga208. 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1988).
209. See, e.g., NIOSH Seeks Information on Occupational Cumulative Trauma Disorders,
[1989 Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) ~ 10,292, at 12,608 (request by
NIOSH for information regarding prevention and intervention procedures for use with CTDs);
House Hearing, supra note 6, at 28 (statement of Perdue Farms, Inc.) (noting that abatement
theories are unproven and that OSHA admits to lack of expertise to deal with CTDs). After
conducting a study of the contribution of occupational risk factors to the development of CTDs,
Silverstein found that "[a]lthough some ergonomic interventions were implemented in the
plantL] .•. this investigation was not able to identify statistically significant improvements in
CTDs that could be attributed to decreases in risk factors." Silverstein et al., supra note 7, at
844.
210. See, e.g., John Gill Ranch, 1987-1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)
1989), discussed supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
211. See Freeman, supra note 29, at 28.

~

28,796, at 38,391 (Nov. 1,

212. See id. (noting that OSHA's abatement orders in CTD citations are broadly stated and
that OSHA lacks the expertise to refine or direct the orders).
213. The employers settling their general duty citations and fines with OSHA typically must
spend millions of dollars to implement the broad, vague, and still unproven ergonomics programs
contained in OSHA's abatement orders. For example, Mallory and Bradford quote the Executive Vice-President of IBP, Inc. as reporting that the cost of implementing the ergonomics program in its settlement with OSHA will exceed one or two million dollars. Mallory & Bradford,
supra note l, at 93. Similarly, Chrysler Corp.'s settlement agreement with OSHA involves implementing a company-wide ergonomics program costing millions of dollars. Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 24.
214. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
215. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177,
5182.
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tion process. In Kastalon, Inc., 216 the OSHRC reviewed an alleged
violation of the general duty clause. OSHA contended that Kastalon
violated its general duty by failing to take adequate measures to protect its employees from a dangerous chemical commonly called
"MOCA." No specific standard governed MOCA exposure; twelve
years earlier, in Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v.
Brennan, 217 the Third Circuit had declared a previously issued standard invalid because the Secretary had failed to conform to the Act's
procedural requirements for promulgation.218 The decisive procedural
flaw had been the Secretary's failure to provide interested parties with
an adequate opportunity to review the advisory committee's recommendations before submitting comments or taking part in the hearings.219 In Kastalon, the OSHRC criticized OSHA's citations as an
attempt to enforce the invalidated standard through the general duty
clause, thus circumventing the Act's fairness goal,220 although the
OSHRC vacated the citation on other grounds. 221 As demonstrated
by these cases, the procedural fairness ensured by the Act's promulgation requirements is both necessary to the issuance of a valid standard
and significant enough to render an expedient use of the general duty
clause invalid.222
OSHA's use of the general duty clause for CTDs similarly fails to
uphold the policies of the Act - notice, consistency, and fairness. It
provides neither preventive measures of sufficient detail to have any
practical value nor procedures that ensure fair treatment of all employers and a workable solution for all employees. Its use for CTDs is
unfair and ineffective and should be declared invalid. An ergonomics
216. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643 (July 23, 1986).
217. 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975).
218. 503 F.2d at 1160-61 (vacat~g procedurally flawed part of standard).
219. Specifically, the Secretary had published the standard before receiving the recommendations and had held a hearing on the standard less than 30 days after receiving the recommendations. See Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643, at 35,972 n.3 (July 23, 1986);
29 u.s.c. § 655(b)(l)-(2) (1988).
220. The OSHRC stated that
[p]articularly in a situation like this, where a standard has been proposed and rulemaking
proceedings have been conducted, the Secretary's failure to complete the rulemaking process, coupled with his issuance of citations under the general duty clause, do not promote
the goals of "fairness and mature consideration of rules of general application" that the
Act's rulemaking provisions were designed to foster.
1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643, at 35,972 (July 23, 1986) (citation omitted).
221. The general duty citations were vacated because the Secretary failed to prove that Kastalon's employees were exposed to a hazard. 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at 35,980.
222. The similarity to OSHA's use of the general duty clause for CTDs is notable. Secretary
Dole researched CTDs through NIOSH and stated her intent to promulgate an ergonomics standard. Dole Issues Ergonomic Guides, supra note 26, at A-7. However, no Secretary has ever
promulgated an ergonomics standard, and no standard is likely to be issued in the near future.
The failure to complete the rulemaking process, coupled with the extended use of the general
duty clause, does not promote the goals of fairness contemplated by the Act and resembles an
attempt to circumvent the Act's procedural requirements for promulgation.
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standard, by contrast, would deal deliberately and fairly with the special problems of CTDs apd thus better serve the Act's policies. Such a
standard is the proper solution to the problem of CTDs.

B.

The Defensibility of the Proposed Solution

The most plausible criticism of this proposal is that, if OSHA stops
prosecuting employers for violations of the general duty clause, then,
until the Secretary promulgates an ergonomics standard, workers will
be totally unprotected from CTDs, in direct contravention of the Act's
central purpose. 223 In the interim, critics would argue, the protection
provided by the general duty clause is at least better than no protection at all, and thus the clause should be used until any potential ergonomics standard is promulgated. 224
The criticism highlights the crucial issue of how best to protect
workers, assuming that there is the requisite causal link between occupational usages and CTDs. While the criticism's concern is genuine, it
is inapposite to this Note's argument and can be easily dismissed.
First, the preceding analysis of the general duty clause and the failure
of CTDs to satisfy the clause's requirements renders OSHA's use of
the clause for CTDs illegitimate.225 The absence of an ergonomics
standard does not change this fact. 226
Second, the criticism is only result-oriented; its insight into the
problem of CTDs is limited by its failure adequately to weigh the policy considerations underlying both the Act and the general duty
clause. Providing workers with a safe and healthful workplace is not
the exclusive purpose of the Act. 227 Whether a particular course of
action protects workers fairly and effectively may often determine
whether OSHA should pursue that action. 228 Because prosecution of
employers for CTDs under the general duty clause consistently violates the Act's policies, such prosecution disrupts the Act's carefully
balanced enforcement scheme. Use of the clause for CTDs is improper and unwarranted even in the absence of an ergonomics
223. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988) (to ensure safe and healthful working conditions).
224. The argument gains even more support from the fact that Secretary Dole's cancellation
of the plans to extend the new ergonomics guidelines for the red meat industry may indicate that
her office is unconvinced that an ergonomics standard is needed. See supra notes 58·60 and
accompanying text. This uncertainty probably further delays promulgation of an ergonomics
standard.
225. See supra Part II.
226. Cf. BOKAT, supra note 58, at 109 (noting that the general duty clause was not intended
to be a substitute for promulgated standards).
227. See supra note 113.
228. See, e.g., Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Assn. v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d
Cir. 1974) (holding a standard invalid insofar as its promulgation failed to uphold the policy of
fair notice), cert denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); Kastalon, Inc., 1986·1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~
27,643, at 35,972, 35,980 (July 23, 1986) (criticizing a use of the general duty clause that violated
the policy of fairness and vacating citation on other grounds).
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standard. 229
Moreover, the criticism fails to appreciate that, without the use of
the general duty clause, workers will be no less protected than they are
now. For example, workers may recover for CTD injuries through
workers' compensation insurance benefits with or without OSHA enforcement. 230 Workers receive no compensation from the general duty
clause. 231 Workers derive "protection" indirectly from the general
duty clause in the form of programs that employers implement as a
result of the clause's enforcement. To the extent that the prosecution
of employers for alleged ergonomics violations of the ·general duty
clause is ineffective, preventive programs will not be worth adopting
for many employers.
The proper way to protect workers from CTDs is through the promulgation of an ergonomics standard. Only through an ergonomics
standard can OSHA protect workers while furthering the Act's policies. The Secretary is free to promulgate a standard for any hazard
that poses a significant risk of harm to workers. 232 There is enough
evidence that CTDs pose a significant risk to satisfy this requirement. 233 For the protection of workers and the integrity of OSHA, the
Secretary can and should promulgate a specific ergonomics standard.
CONCLUSION

CTDs are a serious problem worthy of the Secretary's efforts. The
Secretary, however, has chosen to act through the general duty clause,
an enforcement mechanism particularly inappropriate for use against
229. Because of the primary role of specific standards and the statutory limitations on the
applicability of the general duty clause, the policies of the Act dictate that some hazards that are
not yet covered by a specific standard nevertheless do not fall within the coverage of the general
duty clause. See supra text accompanying note 67. CTDs should be found to be such a hazard.
230. The Act does not affect workers' compensation in any way. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4)
(1988); see also BOKAT, supra note 58, at 728 (finding that states have assented to the separation
of OSHA from workers' compensation). Workers' compensation has been criticized as exacerbating the problem of workplace CTDs. See. e.g., Hadler, supra note 12, at 39-40 (finding that, if
not restricted to discrete traumatic events, workers' compensation can be iatrogenic); Louis,
supra note 12, at 825 ("A system of workers' compensation that was originally designed to protect workers is now working to penalize not only the workers, but all of us - workers, management, and consumers."); Worrall & Appel, supra note 17, at 295-96 (concluding that workers'
compensation gives workers an incentive both to claim more severe disabilities and to claim more
often). Whether workers' compensation helps or aggravates the CTD problem, it will still be
available to workers if OSHA stops using the general duty clause to prosecute employers for
CTDs. Therefore, stopping that use of the clause would result in no less protection for workers
on this ground.
231. See Morey, supra note 39, at 992-93. The goal of the Act is preventive, not remedial. In
re Establishment Inspection of Midwest Instruments Co., 900 F.2d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 1990).
232. See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980).
233. CTDs probably meet the "significant risk" requirement of the general duty clause. See
supra text accompanying note 101. Because this requirement is derived from the same requirement in the promulgation process, see supra note 91, enough evidence of a significant risk of
harm from workplace CTDs exists to allow OSHA to promulgate a standard.
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CTDs. Because CTDs fail to satisfy the clause's requirements for application, OSHA's use of the clause for CTDs is illegitimate. OSHA's
continued use of the clause despite this illegitimacy also impinges on
considerations of notice, consistency, and fairness.
This does not mean that workers should go unprotected from
CTDs. On the contrary, the argument that an ergonomics standard
would better serve the policies of the Act, together with the finding
that CTDs present a "significant risk" of harm, supports the conclusion that the Secretary should promulgate an ergonomics standard. 234
Most who have considered the problem urge this conclusion.23s
The stringent timetable provided in the Act suggests that Congress
intended tb,e Secretary to act quickly and decisively when she discovers a workplace condition that presents a significant risk of harm. 236
Indecisive action - such as announcing and soon thereafter canceling
a plan to promulgate an ergonomics standard and then prosecuting
employers under the general duty clause237 - does not promote the
goals of " 'fairness and mature consideration of rules of general application' that the Act's rulemaking provisions were designed to foster. "238 The Secretary has had more than ample time to begin the
promulgation process.239 The Act dictates, and its policies confirm,
that the Secretary should promulgate an ergonomics standard as
quickly as practicable.

234. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(l) (1988) (stating that the Secretary may promulgate a standard
whenever doing so would serve the objectives of the Act); Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 642
(stating that the Secretary may promulgate a standard when the hazard presents a significant risk
of harm). Anything short of an ergonomics standard, such as ergonomics guidelines, would be
ineffective in dealing with the problem. Guidelines would not carry the same weight as a stan·
dard and, rather than drawing the clear lines of a standard, would leave room for wide misinter·
pretation by OSHA field inspectors. Dan Malovany, Safety Issue Becomes a Pain in the Neck,
Back and Wrist, BAKERY PROD. & MKTG., Oct. 24, 1990, at 25.
235. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 6, at 169-70 (various participants concluding that
the ball is "clearly in OSHA's court;" that OSHA is lagging behind congressional and public
pressure; that an ergonomics standard is needed; and that OSHA could be much more aggressive
in promulgating an ergonomics standard); Huvelle & Michaelson, supra note 17, at 25 (stating
that an ergonomics standard should be promulgated to deal with the special medical concerns of
CTDs).
236. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(l)-(4) (1988); see also S. REP. No. 1282, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5182-5183 (stating that standards must be con·
stantly improved and replaced with new standards as new knowledge and techniques are
developed).
237. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
238. See Kastalon, Inc., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ~ 27,643, at 35,972 (July 23, 1986)
(quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969)).
239. NIOSH requested information regarding work-related CTDs to determine the extent of
the problem and to develop possible prevention strategies at least as early as 1989, with January
22, 1990 as the deadline for data submissions. NIOSH Seeks Information on Occupational Cumulative Trauma Disorders, [1989 Transfer Binder] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH)
~ 10,292.

